A Theory of Justice Revised edition (OISC) (Belknap)

Find very usefull .Simple language used .No prerequisite knowledge necessary to read this book. Gives a new sence of justice .Reviews earlier ethical theories and finds inconcistency in them .prepare a new theory by combining them and adding new.Like- whenever contradiction between liberty and equality ,which balance of these two is just balace?Should property right or any other right be fundamental right?Criteria for any right to be a fundamental right .Thus designing a just and efficient society and institutions.

Good published and good rate

Liked

The most significant philosophical work of the last fifty years is a must read for anyone seriously interested in how we should live at the present time. A complicated and careful book predicated upon a challenging thought experiment it is not the easiest read, you should not expect a plan for our social life in the current historical period to be, but it is necessary that you make the effort.

Very good points but a heavy read

Cover is dirty and pages are folded. Not acceptable given it is a new copy, not second hand and book is not cheap either!!

Covered in dust and dirt and didn’t expect this as it’s quiet expensive, this was supposed to be a birthday present and I can’t find anyway to contact the seller and try to work it out with them.

In this book, John Rawls articulates an understanding of social justice. For Rawls, social justice refers to the basic principles that organize a society; these principles are just if they would be hypothetically chosen by the members of that society when they started from an initial position of equality and ignorance of their particular situation, interests and abilities (the original position). Moreover, he argues that this choice has a definite unique answer; the principles chosen would be (p. 266):- P1: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.- P2: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged; (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.By “fair equality of opportunity” it is meant that “those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system.” (p. 63).In order to interpret those principles, two priority rules need to be applied:- P1 has priority over P2 and therefore the basic liberties can be restricted only for the sake of liberty: (a) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of liberties shared by all; (b) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those with the lesser liberty.- P2b is prior to P2a. An inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those with the lesser opportunity (p. 266).Rawls then goes on to explore what type of society could implement these principles, finding that a constitutional democracy would be a possibility. In addition, he analyzes whether such society would be stable, in the sense of whether individuals in such society would acquire and benefit from having the proposed sense of justice. To this question he also answers in the affirmative, providing a number of developmental and psychological arguments.The book is extremely ambitious, aiming at laying the ground of most moral and political philosophy. Unfortunately I believe that the text fails in this goal, since the arguments presented have many weaknesses and the conclusions found are unconvincing. Nevertheless, the book is an interesting read, since it is carefully written and thought-provoking (and indeed has been extremely influential).The idea of the original position (OP) as a fundamental device to establish justice, while interesting, is nevertheless problematic. In the OP we are asked to think how we would reason if we did not know, not only our position in society, but also our interests and abilities, as well as the particular circumstances of our society (such as the level of civilization and culture). We are, however, assumed to know the general facts about human societies (principles of economics, politics and social organization, as well as human psychology, pp.118-119). It is clear that some of these stipulations are needed to ensure that our choices are not guided by narrow self-serving interests (which presumably have little to do with justice). However, by leaving aside any knowledge about ourselves it becomes unclear who is really choosing, and how we could make or accept that choice. It seems it would be some impersonal being rather than actual people. This becomes particularly problematic if we take Rawls’ Kantian interpretation of the OP whereby he claims that in the OP we express our nature as free an equal rational beings. The idea that in order to express our true selves we need to ignore everything about ourselves seems unsatisfactory. In addition, ignoring the particulars of our society can lead us to make unwise choices (the road to hell is paved with good intentions) or even make the choice itself meaningless.The objections to the reasoning leading from the OP to the two principles are even more profound. The fundamental problem is that Rawls’ analysis in many ways ignores the moral significance of liberty. This contention might seem surprising, given that P1 (which has priority over P2) establishes a claim to “the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties”. The problem is that Rawls has a somewhat narrow notion of “basic liberties”. Basic liberties are to be given by a list, but are not exhaustively enumerated; it is noted, however, that the right to own certain kinds of property (eg. means of production) and laissez-faire freedom of contract are not included in the list; other arguably less fundamental liberties, such as political ones, are, however, included in the list. These choices seem somewhat arbitrary and are not justified. But it seems clear that Rawls’ notion of basic liberties is a relatively limited one. Note that it is this narrow notion of liberty that allows Rawls to propose P2, since P2 would be overridden by a more expansive notion of liberty. One could even say that Rawls presentation is misleading, since he often appeals to the priority of liberty (with the powerful emotional response which this term elicits), but only briefly notes that his notion is a rather constrained one. Without going as far as accusing Rawls of being misleading, we can certainly wish that he had discussed in more detail his notion of liberty, given the centrality of this concept in his theory, and consider this hole a serious deficiency of the book. Moreover, when initially arguing for P2, it is indicated that socioeconomic differences arising due to unequal endowments (be them family wealth and position or innate or acquired abilities) have no moral relevance, and it is therefore legitimate to eliminate them. It is overlooked, however, that those socioeconomic differences can be the result of the application of individual liberty. To the extent that liberty has moral value, those differences would seem to inherit that moral significance. In addition, the argumentation leading for the 2 principles mainly tries to show that they would be preferable to utility maximization. It seems surprising that Rawls does not consider, for example, the possibility that the parties might choose a more minimal set of principles, for example P1 alone (which could resemble Classical Liberalism, provided that an extensive enough notion of liberty is considered). Moreover, the arguments seem rather ad-hoc. For example, it is first argued that in the original position the agents don’t have particular interests (or are unaware of them), but they do value their liberties, therefore they would choose P1; this argument, however, seems to fall into the begging the question fallacy.In conclusion, the book presents a stimulating articulation of fundamental political philosophy ideas. Even if it falls short of its (very ambitious) goals, it is still a work worth contending with.