Philosophy In The Flesh

This book is very important... If you intrested in cognitive science, the philosophy of mind and language you should read this book absolutely. I am sure it will change your world view/ external reality understanding, human relations and art... Revolutionnary and very useful book... Metaphor; maybe it will be a little exageration but, as Lakoff-Johnson's interpretations, we can say like Higgs bozon's impact in our day time life since Descartes...Abdullah Şevki

Excellent

This hefty volume employs the empirical findings of second generation cognitive science to challenge the Western philosophical belief in a rational disembodied mind. The primary method of critical examination utilizes the theories of "unconscious embodied conceptual metaphor" and its origins in sensorimotor experience, to explain how philosophers (old and new) have arrived at their conclusions using a metaphoric logic they mistakenly thought was literal.As you'd expect in a book written by career academics interested in maintaining credibility, it can be hard going at times, and it is certainly not a light read .I found the prolific re-reading of passages was necessary as the unfamiliar terms used, and the theories that where being propounded eroded my concentration somewhat. Also critical points and theories are repeated in different forms, again and again, which although convenient, gives the feeling that 50% of the book is recycled from itself and that the authors have employed a physical metaphorical trick of their own, "that large volumes carry more weight".On the whole though, if you have the time it is well worth the effort,, as it brings philosophy and modern thought in general up-to-date within the context of discoveries in neuroscience, and it makes it possible to understand the grounding and limits of conceptual reasoning and the errors that ensue when the old philosophies are taken as literal truths.

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson acknowledge that cognitive science has reopened central philosophical questions. Their conclusion is that (1) mind is inherently embodied, (2) thought is mostly unconscious, and (3) abstract concepts are largely metaphorical:"There exists no Kantian radically autonomous person, with absolute freedom and a transcendent reason that correctly dictates what is and isn't moral. Reason, arising from the body, doesn't transcend the body [...] There is no poststructuralist person--no completely decentered subject for whom all meaning is arbitrary, totally relative, and purely historically contingent, unconstrained by body and brain" (p.5).I recommend this book to followers of transcendentalism and relativism alike. It is rather dry reading and their analysis not impeccable, but their message is important. Although the authors denote their standpoint as "embodied realism", they nevertheless take the view that our experiences of colour, e.g., must be regarded as subjective. I am not so certain of that. If experience is embodied, and notions of subjective and objective have become relativized, why take the wholly psychological view of colour?I am surprised at the little impact that the findings of cognitive science and the discovery of the unconscious has had on philosophers generally. I had expected old uncle Kant and uncle Husserl to be relegated to the dustbin of obsolete misconceptions by now. I was especially interested to read how Plato had arrived at his complex metaphysic. It builds on a few metaphorical ideas, especially the notion that Essences are both Ideas and Ideals. The rest, including the hierarchy of Being, is given by induction.

Lakoff and Johnson make a very simple and profound observation, on which they subsequently speculate in this hefty (624 page) volume. The observation is that thinking is embodied. That is to say that: “the peculiar nature of our bodies shapes our very possibilities for conceptualisation and categorisation” (19). They expound greatly on this realisation by pointing to endless instances in which so-called ‘abstract’ thinking is rooted in the physical and the bodily. If we cannot think about things without metaphor, and no thoughts have any existence “independent of bodies and brains” (266) then no thought can be truly abstract or objective, they tell us.Their understanding of metaphors is that they “project inference patterns” (82). In this sense the peculiar metaphors that are used to guide understanding impose external patterns that determine the very avenues of thought used by people. Lakoff and Johnson go so far as to suggest (with good reason) that “neural mechanisms used in perception and movement … [may] also [be] used in abstract reasoning” (37). Hence the grandiose expectations expressed in this text anticipate that the world of philosophers will capitulate on previous knowledge and bow to their new discoveries.Some philosophers are selected for particular attack. Descartes is one, who’s ‘ideas as objects in the mind’ thinking we are told is clearly wrong, in the light of recent discoveries made by cognitive science. Ideas are not objects in the mind, we are told. The correspondence theory of truth is rejected. The authors show ways in which ‘faculty psychology’ (that divides the mind into ‘faculties’ or departments rather as a university) is clearly wrong. Instead of these misguided notions for thinking the absolutes we are presented with include basic (universal) categories that are “the source of our most stable knowledge” (29).Having undermined much of the rest of philosophy, where do Lakoff and Johnson end up standing? They are physicalists (110), so they assume the physical world to be ‘real’, philosophically prior, and independent of the mind (233). They believe in everyday reason, and that everyday reason tells us that "there are purposes in the world" (217).One has to wonder – are Lakoff and Johnson justified in simply presupposing the above? They themselves credit theology with setting the stage for Western science (349). Should they not acknowledge that they are making ontological assumptions that are rooted in a particular, Christian, ontological history? Are they claiming that everyone in the world simply knows that the physical world is ‘real’ and that it has purposes, when they themselves acknowledge that what ancient Greek scholars put in place on which the West continues to build are in absolute terms an ‘arbitrary’ presuppositional foundation?Lakoff and Johnson seem to have hobby horses that they are determined to promote regardless of the evidence. One is that the ‘strict father’ metaphor is erroneous; fathers should not be ‘strict’. Second is that Judeo-Christian ‘religions’ are misguided and misleading people and deserve to be abandoned. Third, already mentioned above, is that what they have discovered is a revolution that effectively undermines most of the rest of philosophy.I greatly appreciate the insights given to us by Lakoff and Johnson. I find their undermining of notions of ‘objectivity’ on the basis that almost all thinking is metaphorical and bodily helpful and challenging. There is a sense in which they do provide a profound challenge which should encourage philosophers to go back to the drawing board. It is sad however, to me, that they confuse personal agendas such as of ‘strict fathers’ with the very legitimate things that they have to say. I do not see why their discoveries should be taken as a threat to conventional Western ontologies and metaphysics rooted in faith in revelation, such as that of the ‘Abrahamic religions’. It seems likely to me that biting off more than they can chew may have reduced the overall impact of the very legitimate discoveries that Johnson and Lakoff explore in this text.I highly recommend this text to thinking people who would like to probe the foundations of their understanding. I think the same thinking people will find themselves picking and choosing a little between the authoritative claims made by Lakoff and Johnson. Their basic aim, to challenge philosophical foundations that are often presupposed in Western thought using new insights from cognitive science, I find to be admirable.