Southern Gambit (Campaigns and Commanders Series) (Volume 65) Paperback – Illustrated, October 13, 2020

Dr. Carpenter added greatly to the scholarship of the Southern Campaign of the American War for Independence with "Southern Gambit." Many sources fail to fully explore the British approach to winning the war in the South. The author provides extensive detail in outlining the greater strategy proposed by Lord George Germain, General Sir Henry Clinton, and General Charles, Lord Cornwallis to promote winning the war by first conquering the South. Errors in understanding the nature of the terrain of the South, the enemy they would fight, and the nature of the conflict all contributed to British failure, and the author explores these factors in depth. Dr. Carpenter has a thorough understanding of the strategic, operational, and tactical nature of insurgency warfare. This allows him to analyze the effectiveness of the British approach to that type warfare which has modern parallels in the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. He shows where the British were outperformed by the Patriots in information warfare, or shaping the opinions of the people, and how the inconsistency of policy confused Loyalists and Patriots alike. Efforts of leniency towards the Rebels by Cornwallis failed when they did not mesh with the harsh tactics of subordinates like Tarleton, Ferguson, and Wemmys. Ultimately the author shows that not focusing on securing the British effort in South Carolina before moving into North Carolina and Virginia deprived the British of troops and supplies necessary to make their overall strategy achieve success. An excellent book that supports and enhances the scholarship of the Southern Campaign of the American War for Independence.

The British Southern Strategy that culminated in the surrender at Yorktown in 1781 has been the subject of any number of histories. The distinction of this book, authored by a serving instructor at the U.S. Naval War College, is that it applies the lessons of the ongoing U.S. campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq to the British attempt to end the insurrection in the thirteen colonies via a Southern approach. Author Stanley Carpenter offers a spirited narrative of the campaign, but the real takeaway is his modern analysis of British failures of strategy and execution.It is no small irony that Lord Cornwallis, the senior British commander in the South after the siege of Savannah, was consistently a battlefield winner until his last fight. It is perhaps the point of the narrative that Cornwallis, an aggressive and tactically savvy field general, was overly focused on winning on the battlefield, vice supporting and protecting the Loyalists in the South who may have represented Britain's best chance of prevailing over the rebels. The reader willing to persist through the author's sometimes repetitive style will come away with a better understanding of why the Revolutionary War ended the way it did. Well recommended to the student of the conflict and the general reader.

I reviewed this book for publication and found it to be an engaging read. More than just an historical recounting, it examines the decision-making, operations, and strategy using a military analysis as taught to students at the US military war colleges and universities. The author, a professor at the Naval War College, makes the case, appropriately I believe, that the British underestimated the capability of the American forces, misread the support of the British loyalists, and lost the war though a series of missteps and faulty decisions throughout the Southern campaign.If I were to have a criticism of the work, it could've used additional editing. The author repeats terms and arguments too frequently, especially in the early chapters, to the point it was distracting. However, reading the work as a whole, it is well worth a read and a space on your shelf.If I could give it 4.5 stars, I would.

In a sea of books that simply recite troop movements, casualty lists and other droll facts, this book stands out. Dr. Carpenter gives the story behind the story. Using his immense knowledge of strategy and tactics culled over his years teaching those topics to senior military officers at the Naval War College, Professor Carpenter delves into the strategic thinking behind the British campaign in the South during the American Revolutionary War. Using a treasure trove of supporting documents, he provides a glimpse into the thinking of Cornwallis, Clinton, Washington, Greene and others. In addition, he utilizes the writings of Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu and military strategies throughout history to analyze the successful and flawed strategies of each commander. Finally, he probes each action and engagement under the microscope of "what if?" This book is destined to be a classic in military history.

Written more like a high level after action report than a typical history book. A great contribution to understanding Britain's final effort to subdue the American Revolution, and its utter failure to achieve the desired results. The story is simple, if you allow flawed thinking to direct strategy, failure to achieve the desired results is a foregone conclusion. The disconnect between the political drivers, the King and his ministers, and the Army and Navy commanders on the spot is striking. Disunity of command and control between two services, the Royal Navy and the British Army are the hammer blow that results in the surrender of Cornwalis at Yorktown and the independance of the United States of America

Excellent!

I found this book to be very helpful in understanding the late Southern campaigns of the American War of Independence. The writer's style was lucid. I found his discussion of the Battle of Guilford Court House very useful in understanding 18th century linear battlefield tactics. The presentation of the personalities involved in strategic decision making was fascinating.

This book gets a lot of details wrong. This may be from authors unfamiliarity with subject matter. There are also faulty arguments in the book. Often contradicts himself. Very repetitive writing style and full of jargon. No original thesis.