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B**L
An important step towards a comprehensive theory of concepts
Prinz's book is an intriguing blend of traditional philsophy and up-to-date cognitive science. His main argument is that concepts are basically "copies" of perceptual experiences, bound together in long-term memory and accessed by working memory during thought. Prinz argues that, instead of assuming a "common code", cognitive science should view the mind as a "multi-media machine" that uses a diverse array of codes specific to sense modalities. Along the way, he argues against concept nativism, expands on what perceptional experiences are, and elucidates possible mechanisms for concept acquisition and combination.Keep in mind, though, that Prinz's book is fast-paced and assumes a lot of background knowledge. Many of the details that one would have liked are either glossed over or left for future research. And the editor's at MIT press need to do a much better job of proof-reading in the future. But in terms of setting up a new research program and arguing forcfully for it, Prinz's book does the job. This book should get a lot of reaction in years to come.