Curtis LeMay: Strategist and Tactician (The Generals) Paperback – Illustrated, September 9, 2014

* CURTIS LEMAY – Strategist and Tactician Copyright 2009By Warren Kozak (Reviewed by Allen Benzing 7/2020)This is a very good, well-researched, comprehensive biography of a ‘one of a kind’ leader. While ‘Strategist and Tactician’ certainly describe his strengths, he was primarily seen by his men as a strong leader. Fearsome and harsh at times, he also knew how to get out of the way and let his men do their jobs – to his very high expectations.Surprisingly, he did not shout and berate to get his point across, as his demeanor might indicate. Rather, his delivery was quiet, with few spoken words. He never felt comfortable speaking in public, even though he led thousands of men. He’s better known for short, blunt, and often misunderstood public statements.His serious countenance came early, when he practically supported his mother and sisters before he was 10 years old. His father was a ‘dreamer’ who was always in pursuit of the next great deal, frequently uprooting his family.In the military, LeMay was smart enough to ‘see the big picture’. This often provided him with a way forward, i.e. knowing the loopholes or who could help, while still ‘following orders’, which is what got him an Air Cadet slot. He wanted to fly the new B-17s and eventually did.Hap Arnold and other superiors saw him as a ‘can do’ leader, so he was often tasked with almost impossible missions. He was ordered to Wendover, UT when there were no buildings, men, materials, parts or airplanes – and ordered him to train squadrons of men to fly the B-17. Then to Muroc Lake, which was worse!After being assigned to move his B-17s, men and equipment to England, he heard those orders were to be cancelled and the Squadron would be sent to the Pacific. He knew his way around the ‘system’ enough to have new orders delayed long enough to get to England – once there, the new orders were cancelled.In England, he was a tireless proponent of training his crews to give them a better chance at survival. He led large bomber formations, critiquing and cajoling them to fly tighter, precise formations, to defend against fighters. He also insisted that the bombardiers have a steady straight and level segment from the IP to the target, with no evasive maneuvers to avoid flak. This seemed suicidal, but he knew that was the only way to hit a target – and avoid returning to bomb it again. To his immense credit, he said “I’ll fly lead”. It was this type of leadership and the ability to find solutions to intractable problems that served him through many subsequent assignments.Time and again he’d be assigned a job that he knew nothing about, had no resources or even infrastructure, and it was up to him to figure it out. Staging B-29’s out of India, flying the Hump and bombing targets in Indochina and Japan from deep in China was one of those impossible situations.He was ordered to not fly combat missions, but he vigorously argued with Hap Arnold that he had to fly at least 1 mission, to know how to lead his crews. He was allowed 1 mission, where fighters approached but did not attack, however, they were hit by flak. Interestingly, one of the more vexing issues was getting ‘Allies’ like Chiang Kai-shek to support the plan! With all the obstacles, it’s amazing any missions were flown from Chengdu.Once the Marianas Islands were won, LeMay was put in charge of the Operational aspects of Hap Arnold’s B-29s. He was famous/infamous for his dramatic decision to change from the unsuccessful high-level formation bombing to low-level night attacks – with gunners and guns removed – except for the tail gunner. This was controversial but proved to be successful as the philosophy changed to area bombing of the widely dispersed war production, with incendiaries. As with previous difficult decisions, the over-riding factor was that increased losses due to more dangerous missions would ultimately save a lot of lives by bringing the war to an end. The same logic held for Truman’s decision to use the Atomic bombs.LeMay was distraught at the rapid drawdown of the Air Force after WWII, and predictably, they were wholly unprepared when the Korean War started. B-29s had been sitting in the desert and were lacking maintenance when called to duty.I thought LeMay started SAC, but he inherited it, and it was a mess - which he cleaned up in short order. The Berlin Airlift was unexpected and required a lot of new ideas to make it work, and they did. Bay of Pigs and similarly the Cuban Missile crises were devoid of planning, so crews and planes had to be cobbled together. Not a recipe for success.Later he was assigned to Washington as Air Force Chief under JFK and LBJ – an unnatural coupling. He was not suited to DC and knew it but soldiered on to try to influence the President and Congress on keeping a strong Air Force – and building the B-70. He sparred continually with Robert McNamara, particularly over the half-measures used in Vietnam.After retiring, it seemed that he’d keep a low profile, and mostly succeeded. But, George Wallace was running as a 3rd Party Candidate for President and needed a VP. LeMay flatly turned down the idea of political office, but about 30 days before the election he was persuaded that Humphrey might win and would be a disaster for the country. So, he agreed to be on the Wallace ticket, perhaps making it easier for Nixon to win and ending the Vietnam War. His short tenure as VP candidate was fraught with peril. Although his public comments were contrary to Wallace’s, associating with an avowed racist was a disaster for LeMay.Military and Civilian friends had stridently warned him, but the damage to his reputation was done. LeMay didn’t care as much as others since he was used to being in a position where he was not liked, but his legacy was tarnished.

LEMAY by Warren KozakBOOK REVIEW by Arthur W. Harrigan, Seattle, Wa. LeMay had an exterior as blunt as a bulldozer, but his power lay in sublety, craft, planning, and then meticulous, relentless execution. This book mirrors its subject. The prose has few frills. The author's skill lies in painting a subtle portrait using the same plain-speak Curtis Le May employed to get his job done. LeMay is a worthy subject. He is a thread that wound its way with ever-growing power through five decades of tumult. LeMay came to age at the outset of the Great Depression, was in at the birth of our Air Force, rose to command leadership in World War II, ran the Berlin Airlift and then the Strategic Air Command through and beyond the Korean War, predicted the failure at the Bay of Pigs, and became Air Force Chief under Kennedy in spite of the President's dislike for him. Le May's genius consistently shone through his off-putting shell. Le May was subtly implacable. He planned his maneuvers and executed them with daring and determination. LeMay was not without charm, but he had a daunting demeanor. He had no interest in cultivating friendship in the ranks or in socializing with his superiors. Instead, because of his stunning effectiveness, he was soon respected, then admired, then revered from below and from above. He was a real military man. He lived and worked to defeat those who would do his country harm, but worked just as hard to find ways to do it at least cost in American lives. At every key turning point along the way, Le May outmaneuvered the enemy--which, more often than not, included both the nominal enemy and the military bureaucracy. LeMay did not engage in these tactics primarily to advance himself. In 1931, he turned down a 600% increase in pay from nascent American Airlines to remain a soldier at a time when he had no reason to believe he would even be promoted in the stagnant U.S. military machine of that era. Le May was ambitious, but his ambition was to be justly admired for getting his military job done--and, like many very effective people, to avoid screwing up. The author has a fine talent for staying out of the way of his own story. And what a story it is. The book opens a series of unique windows into critical events in our history, beginning with the birth of large-scale aerial bombardment, with Le May as its American father. This chapter at the outset of Le May's rise epitomizes the combination of genius, craft, determination, and stubbornness that he brought to every job. After being assigned his own air group immediately after arriving in England in 1942, Le May was offended by, and doubted, the conventional wisdom then governing aerial bombardment over Germany. American generals had rejected the British night-bombing approach in favor of "targeted" daylight bombing, but American B-17 pilots were expected to "jink" over the target to avoid anti-aircraft fire. Le May concluded that his men could not hit the targets while preoccupied with dodging flak. Le May believed the point of the massive investment the country had made in bombers and crew was to blow up the targets, not to focus on preserving the investment. But he also doubted that anti-aircraft fire was effective enough to justify dodging around in the air to avoid it. After days of calculations and planning, Le May set a course straight over the target for the next bombing run. Faced with fear and opposition, he decided to fly the mission himself, in the lead, and most-targeted, aircraft. Le May had one reservation: since he had never flown in a bombing mission and never been fired upon in combat, he wondered if he would be afraid--but he did not wonder about the accuracy of his judgment. Le May was right. Not one plane was lost to anti-aircraft fire. The bombing results were in a class by themselves. Le May's approach was immediately adopted fleet-wide. Le May's men revered him for finding a way to the job they were there to do without increased risk to them--and for flying in the most vulnerable plane on his experimental mission. This Le May pattern is repeated throughout a career of spectacular effectiveness at critical moments in our military history. The story is inherently absorbing. The author presents Le May with skill and finesse. A very worthwhile read.

A compact review of the career of Curtis LeMay, interesting in part but much material sourced from General LeMay's autobiography, and "Iron Eagle'', a far superior biography, written by Thomas M. Coffey. I also found the references to the Royal Air Force's Bomber Command to be anti-British, eg reference to possibly Bomber Command's best-known mission - the breaching of the Ruhr dams by 617 Squadron - is dismissed as one dam ''being damaged'' (and training flights carried out over Scotland when it was in fact over Derbyshire); referring to the head of Bomber Command, Sir Arthur 'Bomber' Harris as 'Butcher' Harris, and referring to Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC as ''Leonard Cherise''. Now, if such mistakes are made in a handful of references, what other errors lurk within this book....I don't know, as I gave up reading at Page 146 of 434...

An unusually engaging and thoroughly well-written biography of the man and his life. I initially purchased the book because I was interested in the story of how a prominent World War 2 hero beloved by the public managed to become unilaterally despised, and sink so far down as to end up on the election ticket of notorious racist George Wallace. Generally I dont find biographies particularly readable, especially long ones, but this one was excellently written in regards to prose and detail, and the structure of it gives much-needed clear context to the controversial actions LeMay took later in his life. In fact, i'd say I came out with not only immense respect, but sympathy for the man. Truly a remarkable character, highly recommended biography for military enthusiasts and political aficionados alike!

A deservingly well written tribute to a determined, consummate and at times lonely leader who, appalled at America's unpreparedness for war helped to arm it as a world superpower.

Tough hard bastard but he got the job done!

Great book